

Integration of renewables into the power markets of Europe: the German perspective

Joint Workshop

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The Institute

Private Think Tank Independent expertise for policy and decision makers

Areas of expertise

- Liberalised energy markets
- Renewable Energies
- Regional energy and climate protection concepts
- Decentralised energy systems
- Carbon and green certificate trading

Legal form arrhenius consult gmbh (private limited liability)

Office Hamburg

Founding year 2005

Svante **Arrhenius**

- Swedish physicist and chemist (1859 -1927)
- First (1895) to discover the role of carbon dioxide for climate on earth and to predict anthropogenic climate change




Integration of renewable energies into power markets



Possible view on market integration

TODAY




*) FiT = Feed-in Tariff (in Germany = EEG)

Integration of RE into power markets



One possible view on what market integration could be...



Focus of this presentation
(Wind and PV important in Germany)

*) FiT = Feed-in Tariff



Background on EEG in Germany

Background

- EEG (= Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz: feed-in tariff scheme):
 - Feed-in tariff based on total average costs over 20 years
 - 80% RE in 2050 as part of the Energiewende (other parties: 100% in 2030)
- Increase in RE-mark-up (EEG-Umlage) over the last years
 - especially for private households

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
1,2	1,2	2,05	3,53	3,59	5,28	6,2 to 6,5
ct/kWh	ct/kWh	ct/kWh	ct/kWh	ct/kWh	ct/kWh	(estimated)

- Reductions/ exemption for large industrial power consumers
- Support/ acceptance is decreasing



EEG needs to be “improved” or replaced?


- Important to note:
 - Energiewende needs private investors
→ incentive to invest imparative
 - Merit-order effect of RE reduces power price, thus revenues:
 - With high shares of intermittent renewables, investments do not refinance in current market scheme (revenue gap)
 - additional revenues are required; need for “support scheme” (better “financing scheme” when talking about 80% market share)



**Specific costs/
revenues
(€/MWh)**

Total cost
= average costs *
expected generation

Total average costs
(€/MWh)



Average revenue
(with direct sales)
(€/MWh)

Revenue gap
needs to be closed through financing scheme

Total revenues from direct sales
= average revenue * expected generation




**Generation
(MWh)**

Expected generation
over life time



EEG needs to be "improved" - or replaced?



*) TAC = Total Average Costs




Aspects to be considered

- Direct marketing vs. central buyer
- Market-based vs. governmental determination of support/ financing level
- Financing schemes focuses on total average cost vs. revenue gap



Aspects to be considered



addresses: TAC*)

addresses: revenue gap


FID = final investment decision

Based on Kopp et al. 2013



*) TAC = Total Average Costs



Looking back from the end: 80 % RE in 2050 *)



=



- Hydro
- Bio-energy
- ...



Presumably not...

*) similar for different targets in different years



Trade-off

- High preference for market-based
 - Policy makers do not want to decide for/ against certain technologies/ companies → the market shall decide

- Need for financing scheme (to bridge revenue gap)
 - This schemes needs to determine contributions of the different technologies (sooner or later)

Short comments on the instruments



Price instruments

1. EEG:

- Pro: stable revenue stream / high incentive to invest
- Con:
 - quantities different to control (best ex-post)
 - TAC^{*)} to be estimated by government

2. Flexible market premium

- Pro:
 - power value driven investment/ operation (\neq produce & forget)
 - stable revenue stream / high incentive to invest
- Con:
 - quantities different to control (best ex-post)
 - TAC^{*)} to be estimated by government

^{*)} TAC = Total Average Costs

Short comments on the instruments



Price instruments

3. Fix bonus (government)

- Pro: ?? (*less expensive than EEG?*)
- Con:
 - Government must assess
 - TAC^{*)}
 - Power prices / revenue gap over project life-time (20 yrs)
 - Quantities even more different to control (best ex-post)

^{*)} TAC = Total Average Costs



Price instruments

4. Fix bonus (auction)

- Pro: Use of private information of project developers
- Con: Possibly still high risk with regard to invest
(e.g. for Germany: design of capacity mechanism,
discussion on EU emission trading scheme: backloading,
carbon-prices: development of power prices highly
uncertain)



Quantity-based instruments

5. Flexible market premium (auction/ tenders)

- Pro:
 - Use of private information of project developers
 - Quantity control (via tenders)
 - Control on regional distribution (hot spots/ bottlenecks)
- Con: ??



Quantity-based instruments

6. Quota (incl. certificate trading)

- Pro:
 - Use of private information of project developers (e.g. TAC^{*)})
 - Quantity control
 - *EU common (energy) market compatible (?)*
- Con:
 - High risk with regard to certificate prices^{*)}
→ high investment risk (with no benefits)

^{*)} see Bode (2008) Anreize für Investitionen in Anlagen zur Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien im liberalisierten Strommarkt, in ZfU 4, S. 497 – 516 (in German only)

^{*)} TAC = Total Average Costs



Short comments on the instruments

IF the EEG is to be replaced...

Revenues from direct sales


Quota
Tender
Fix premium

Revenue from RE Financing scheme

Quota

Tender

Fix premium



Conclusion



There is a strong case for tenders (auctions) as financing scheme for RE...

...but presumably we won't see it for quite a while.

(short comment on elections in Germany on September 22)